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iSUMMARY
High system reliability in computer and control systems is
necessary to meet the requirements of mission success. Using
fault tolerant computers, rather than extremely reliable
components, can be a more effective method of acheiving the
desired system reliability. The architecture of NASA^s
Ultra-reliable Fault Tolerant Control System (UFTCS) is based on
a larger number of redundant components and static redundancy
management. This approach, as applied to vehicle control,
consists of parallel and redundant paths of sensor modules,
computation modules, and voter modules to acheive the fault
tolerant operation.
This report analyzes the reliability of the NASA UFTCS
architecture	 as it is currently envisioned for helicopter
control. The analysis is ext6nded to air transport and
spacecraft control using the saF ^omputational and voter modules
applied within the UFTCS archite,iare. The system reliability is
calculated for several points in the helicopter, air transport,
and space flight missions when there are initially 4 2 5, and 6
operating channels. Sensitivity analyses are used to explore the
effects of sensor failure rates and different system
configurations at the 10 hour point of the helicopter mission.
These analyses show that the primary limitation to system
reliability is the number of flux windings on ^,,ach flux summer (4
are assumed for the baseline case). Tables of system reliability
at the 10 hour point are provided to allow designers to choose a
configuration to meet specified reliability goals.
J
INTRODUCTION
High system reliability in computer and control systems is
necessary to meet the requirements of mission success. Even with
the most reliable components envisioned to be available in the
near future, a fault tolerant system architecture is required to
meet system reliability goals.
z
There are many approaches to implementing fault tolerant
computing.	 Several of these which are newly available in the 	 }
commercial market place are described in [1]. Two approaches for
aircraft control are described in [21 and [3]. These two
methods, which were developed before the dramatic reductions in
size, power requirements, and weight of microelectronics,t depend
on complex logic and system reconfiguration to minimize the
amount of hardware.
A
V
The architecture of NASA's Ultra—reliable Fault Tolerant
Control System (UFTCS) 141 relies on a larger number of redundant
components and static redundancy management. This approach, as 	 C
applied to vehicle control, consists of parallel and redundant
	
if
paths of sensor modules, computation modules, and voter modules
to achieve the fault tolerant operation. This architecture
encourages spatial distribution of the modules and different
hardware and/or software in the parallel paths to reduce the risk
of common mode failures and common mode design errors.
The purpose of this report is to perform a reliability
analysis for the NASA UFTCS architecture as it is currently
envisioned for helicopter control,. The analysis is extended to
air transport and spacecraft control using the same computational
and voter modules applied within the UFTCS architecture.
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SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS
Functional Description
The NASA Ultra-reliable Fault Tolerant Control System
(UFTCS) is based on the concept of interconnected modules for
sensing, computation, actuation, and voting, and these modules
contain parallel and redundant processes running asynchronously.
The outputs of each sensor module and each computation module are
cross-strapped to voting elements; that is, the output of each
sensor module and the output of each computation module is
directed to all following voting elements.
A typical block diagram for the control of a helicopter is
ahown in Figure 1 which displays N. sensor modules and their
voters, NC computation modules and their voters, and the voting
flux summers for each of the N a actuators. Each solid line in
the diagram is a fiber optic communications path on which data
are transmitted serially, and each dashed line is an analog
signal path.
Each sensor module contains one sensor for each required
measurement and thus the sensor module is capable of producing a
completa measurement set. The sensor module sends the readings
of all its sensors to all voters over the fiber optic link. It
is possible -to obtain a complete measurement as long as there is
at least one valid sensor (and its corresponding transmitter) for
each required measurement located somewhere within the NM sensor
modules. In other words, sensors may fail within all sensor
modules and a complete measurement set can still be realized.
Each voter following the sensor modules passes a valid
measurement set to a single computation module. The output of
each computation module is cross-strapped to four voter modules
3
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which drive the actuators. These voters have one digital to
analog converter (DAC) connected to every voting flux summer.
Only four voters follow the computation modules because, in the
system shown here, each voting flux summer r quires four analog
inputs each having limited authority. (The more general system
configuration may have other than four voters, but there must be
one for each analog input to the voting flux summers.)
Power Supplies
The ship's four redundant power supplies provide 1 .28 volt DC
unregulated power. These four supplies are cross-strapped to
each circuit card and sensor (see the appendix for the circuit
diagram).
Sensor Module
It is assumed for the analysis that each sensor module
contains one sensor for each required measurement, and that all
sensors are digitally encoded and feed into a computational
element for transmission to the voter stage. (A computational
element contains one 8086/8087 circuit card as shown on Drawing
A14-82-235-101 supplied by NASA). The following assumptions have
bee7;i made for the capabilities of the UFTCS:
Helicopter and Air Transport: The mission requires
stability augmentation, altitude hold, and heading select. To
meet these requirements, the following sensors are included in
each sensor module:
1	 Altimeter
5
J^
1	 Flux gate compass (long term heading reference)
2	 Accelerometers (long term gravity reference)
3	 Rate gyros G
a
Space Flight: The mission requires maintaining inertial
attitude; thus the assumed sensors are
3	 Angular position sensors (optical)'
3 Rate gyros
t
Input Voter Module
The computations within the input voter module are performed
^a
by	 an	 8086/8087 design
	 (adapted	 from NASA
	
Drawing
A14-82-235-102). The voter module receives an input from each	 J,
sensor module via the optical fiber communications link (one 'link
for each sensor module). This requires one optical receiver and 	 G
one 8751 input/output processor for each link. so  that, in
i
general, the failure rate of each voter depends on the number of
parallel, redundant paths.
The logic of the voter modules has not beef: specified at
this	 point, yet certain characteristics are likely to be
inecrporated. A voter logic which contains time history
information will be useful in detecting hardover failures even
with only two operating channels, allowing operation to one valid
channel.	 With two channels operating, however, it would not be
possible to unambiguously detect a drifting failure.
	 See the
Analysis Section for a further discussion of this point.
6
or
Computation Module
The computation modules are made up of three 8086/8087
computation elements (adapted from NASA Drawing A14-82-235-101)
sharing the computational load. 	 Thus the failure of any
component
	 in any one of the three computational elements
constitutes a failure of the module.
Output Voter Module
Like the input voter module, the computations within the
output voter module are performed by an 8086/8087 design (adapted
from NASA Drawing A14-82-235-102). The voter module receives an
input from each computational module via the optical fiber
communications link (one link for each computational module). As
with the input voter module, the failure rate of each output
voter depends on the number of parallel, redundant paths.
The number of output voter modules is limited to four
because of the quarter authority characteristics of the flux
summer.
Voting Flux Summer Module
Each actuator is driven by four analog signals from output
voter DACs, and each of these four signals has one quarter
authority (flux summing). In addition, the voting flux summers
can disconnect any of these drive signals if the error between
the drive signal and the actuator feedback signal exceeds a
specified threshold for a specified time. The UFTCS actuators
will be considered operational if there are at least two of the
four drive signals connected.
w
7
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The following assumptions have been made for the actuator
assignments in the three environments:
Helicopter:
	 pitch, i,oll, yaw, collective
Air Transport: pitch, roll, yaw, ganged throttle quadrant
SEace jj ht:
	 pitch, roll, yaw
ANALYSIS
Introduction
The reliability characteristics of the UFTCS are analyzed in
this section leading to a computable expression for its predicted
reliability over a given mission interval. The assumptions and
approximations used in the analysis are stated. The formulation
is general as to the number of power supplies, sensor modules,
etc. employed in the system and it allows for different numbers
of different modules. Thus, if the least reliable module should
prove to be the sensor module, for example, the final reliability
expression is applicable to a configuration that has more sensor
modules than computation modules. This will permit the tailoring
of a system to meet a reliability specification with a minimum
number of components.
Assumptions
The assumptions used in this analysis are summarized in this
section. These assumptions are common to most reliability
analyses.
8
(i)
i
+'
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1) The failures we are analyzing, as reflected in the
failure rates assigned, are permanent failures, not transient
0
failures. This assumption seems especially well justified for
the UFTCS because of its ability to return a component to active
status after it had . been declared failed for a transient reason.
2) The failure rate is assumed constant for all components.
This nearly universal assumption is appropriate for high
reliability systems in which a burn-in period is used to
eliminate early failures due to manufacturing defects which have
escaped inspection_, and components which are subject to wearout
effects are replaced on a scheduled basis.
3) Failures of individual	 components	 are	 considered
independent.	 In a highly redundant system, it is important that
the design of the components be such as to essentially guarantee
this condition.
	 This requires electrical isolation, spatial
	 z
diversity and other measures to reduce the likelihood of one
failure	 inducing	 others or single events causing several
failures. r
The combination of assumptions (2) and (3) means that the
reliability of modules which have no redundancy within the nodule
is given by the exponential form:
K(tm) = P (Module works at least as long as tm)
= exp (-atm)
with	 A = Sum of the Ai for all the components which
are essential to the function of the module.
9	 ^.
Pn	 _	 --
	4) We assume all system components to be operational at the
	 i
	
beginning of this mission. It may be useful, in future studies, 	 ;!
to relieve this assumption, but in a combinatorial analysis such
as is pursued here, it is very difficult to account for all
combinations of system status at the beginning of the mission.
The operational procedure for the system will surely be designed
to approach this condition as closely as possible - and with the
capacity for self-checking which is inherent in the structure of
the system, it should be possible to do very well.
e
Approximation
	
One approximation is employed to facilitate this analysis.
	
i
	
That is to associate failure.- of the fiberoptic communication 	 3
I
links and optical receivers and input/output processors in the
voters with the module that drives them - the sensor module in
	
the case of the input voters and the computation module in the
	 F:
case of the output voters. The driving module is considered to
function only if it and all the communication links, optical
receivers and input/output processors it drives also function.
This is a conservative assumption in that it underestimates the
	
reliability of the system. Without this assumption, one has to 	 {
consider all combinations of sensor modules, optical receivers,
and voter processors which permit the system to function. This
	
is a very difficult combinatoric task. With the assumption, the
	 ll
sensor modules and associated optical receivers and input/output
processors can be treated separately from the voter processors,
because under the assumption, if the required number of sensor
modules are working, the sensor data is available to the voter
processors.	 It is then an independent quastion whether the
required number of voter processors are working.
With this approximate treatment of both the input voters and
k-
10 
	
^ ^
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1 '"
output voters, the components are associated for the purpose of
the following analysis as shown in Figure 2.
Power Supply System
There are Np unregulated power supplies tied to the power
buss. Any one is capable,of supplying the load of powering the
flight control system. Failures of these supplies are considered
independent ,Tkich implies isolation such that failure of one
cannot induce failures in other supplies or in other system
components.
R	 = P !fit 7 east onepss
	
(	 power supply works)
P(Not all power supplies have failed)
1 - (1 - Rps)Np
Rps is the reliability of each unregulated power supply.
	
1
Sensor System
Even with the approximation stated above, which isolates
consideration of the sensor modules from the input voters, the
sensor system is somewhat complex to analyze because of the
interaction of sensor failures and sensor module common component
failures. It is assumed that the input voters vote on the data
from the different sensors separately, so it may be possible for
the system to function on good gyro data from module 1, good
accalerometer data from module 2, etc. Thus the failure of any
one sensor does not rule out use of the data from the other
11
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sensors in that module. However, failure of the sensor module
common components denies all of the sensor data from that module.
For economy of terminology, we will use the term "sensor
module' in this section to refer to the sensor Module common
components and,
	 under	 the	 stated	 assumption,
	 all	 the
communication	 links,	 optical
	
receivers	 and	 input/output
processors the module drives. As shown in Figure 2, the
reliability of that combination of components is called Rsm. The
reliability of the sensor system will be evaluated by decomposing
on the mutually exclusive set of events that k sensor modules
work - for k = 0, 10 —Nm.
N
Rss = P(k sensor modules work)P(Correct sensor systemXk=1
data) k sensor modules work)
P(k sensor modules work) = ( Nm)k  Rk sm (1 - Rsm)Nm-k
where (Nm) is the binomial coefficient.
k
(Nm) _	 Nm
k 	 k! Nm-k !
If only 1 sensor module is working, we can derive good sensor
data only if all the sensors in that particular module work and
the input voters can decide which module is the working one.
13
ti
(i)
P(Correct sensor syst
—n data
	 1 sensor module works)
Ns
jj Rsi	 P(Last sensor module Failure is covered)
i=1
The probability that the last sensor module failure is covered is
at least 0.5, which would result from a random choice of the two
modules when the failure occurs, and could well be greater than
that due to the fact that all the censor data from the failed
module go bad at once when the module fails.
For k greater than 1, the issue of covering module failures
does not occur because the midpoint select logic reliably
discriminates the failed module from among 3 or more.
P(Correct sensor system data I k sensor modules works) =
P(Correct gyro data and correct accelerometer data
and	 k sensor modules work)
Ns P(Correct sensor i data I k sensor modules
i=1
work)
t
14
0
P(Correct sensor i data , k sensor modules work) =
P (Exactly 1 good sensor i in lc modules and the
last failure was covered, or exactly 2 good
sensors i in k modules, or	 or exactly k
good sensors i in k modules)
Again, the question of failure coverage only arises when we fail
from 2 good sensors to 1. Because these events are mutually
exclusive,
P(Correct sensor i data I k sensor modules work) =
P(Exactly 1 good sensor in k modules)P(Last
failure was covered) + P(Exactly 2 good
sensors in k modules) + " ' + P(Exactly
k good sensors in k modules)
P(Exactly J good sensors i in k modules) = (k) I, Si (1 - Rsi ) k j
P(Last failure was covered) = Mast failure was drifting
type)xP(Failure was covered 1 Drifting failure)
.-,
+ P(Last failure was hardover type)P(Failure was covered
Hardover failure)
= fdfP(Failure was covered l Drifting failure)
+ (1-fdf)P(Failure was covered ! Hardover
failure)
'),,I
The expression for last failure coverage decomposes all sensor
failures into drifting type and hardover type. In this context,
It hardover" should be interpreted to mean "all failures other than
drifting failures". The probability of covering these ,wo modes
of sensor failure could be different;
	 the probability of
	
b
covering a hardover failure should be close to 1 and the
probability of covering a drifting failure may be only 0.5 which
would result from a random choice from the two sensors.
The following identity can be used to simply the expression
for the probability of having correct sensor i data given k good	 }
sensor modules
k
P(Exactly i good 'sensors in k modules) = 1
J=O
Therefore	
,I
k
P(Exactly i good sensors in k modules) = 1 - P(0	 ^!
J=2
good sensors in k modules) - P(1 good sensor in 	 x
k modules)
P(Correct sensor i data 	 k sensor modules work)
= P(1 good sensor in k r.odules)P(Last failure was
covered)
+ 1 - P(0 good sensors in k modules)
- P(1 good sensor in k modules)
= 1 - (1-Rsi) k - P(1 good sensor in k modules)[1
P(Last failure was covered)] 	 1
1 - (1-Rsi) k - kRsi(1-Rsi) k-1P(Last sensor failure
not covered)
k,.
16
0	 4
Both the fraction of drifting failures, fdf, and the p'tobabilty
of last failure coverage can be different for each type of
f3
sensor. This last expression for the probability of correct
sensor i data with k good sensor modules applies only for k
greater than or equal to 2. The expression for k equal to 1 was
given earlier.
Input Voters and Computation Modules
	
s
We can fail to 2 of these channels without question because
midpoint select in the output voters will distinguish 1 failed
channel out of 3. Whether 1 failed channel out of 2 can be
identified is unclear, but even if a random choice is made of the
remaining two channels when one fails, there is probability 0.5
that the working channel will be selected and thus permit
operation of the system with just one computational channel.
Rcs = P(Exactly 1. channel works)P(Last channel failure
	
I
V
is covered)
N'' c
+ ;P P(Exactly k channels work)
k=2
With the same approach used to simplify the expression for the
probability of correct sensor i data given k good sensor modules,
this ca- be restated as
u
17
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n
Res = 1 - (1-Rvc) Nc - N cRvc( 1-Rvt) Ny-1P(Last channel failure
was not covered)
R
As indicated in Figure 2 1
 Rvcis- the reliability of each channel
of	 voter	 processor,	 computation	 module,	 and associated
31
communication
	 links,	 optical
	
receivers
	 and	 input/output	
ra
processors. Ne is the number of those channels in the system
which need not be the same as the number of sensor modules or
output voters. The probability that the last channel failure was
not covered should be no greater than 0.5.
Output Voters and Actuators
Because of the flux summing operation on the actuators, the
output voters, actuator drivers, and actuators must be treated
together. The term "actuator driver" is used here to designate
the circuitry that connects the output voter processor to the
current coil on the actuator servo valve.
	 The	 principal
Icomponents of the actuator driver are indicated in Figure 2 to be
the D/A converter and the current amplifier. There are Noou'tput
voters and the requirement for system operation will be taken to
be the correc •^ application of current to Nf of the No coils on each
actuator. `i'he number Nf of correct fluxes required on each
actuator for proper operation depends on how.well the effects of
failed channels can be limited.
The reliability of the Voter-Actuator system will be
decomposed on the number of working voter processors.	 t.
18
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Rva =	 P(Exactly k voter processors work)P(Actuator 1
k=Nf
system works and actuator 2 system works
and	 and actuator Na system works ( k voter
processors work)
_Na[P(Exaetly k voter processors work)IP(Actuator i
k=Nf
system works I k voter processors work),	 f
P(Exactly k voter processors work)_
(Mo) Rkp(1-Rvp)No-k
P(Actuator i system works I k voter processors work) =
P(Actuator i works)P(At least Nf fluxes on actuator i
are correct I k voter processors work)
P(Actuator i works) = Rai
P(At least Nf fluxes on actuator i are correct I k voter
k
processors work) _ 1:
	
P(Exactly j actuator drivers
J =Nf
from k voters work)
2 (k)
j Rad •(1-Radi )
J
k-^
=N f,
Summary
The predicted reliability of the Ultra-reliable Fault
Tolerant Control System with an arbitrary number of components is
computed by the following series of calculations:
Component or module reliability:
19
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For the given mission time, compute all component or module
reliabilities as
Ri = exp(-Aitm)
Power supply system reliability:
Rpss
	 1 - (1-Rps)NP
Sensor system reliability:
P(Last sensor failure was not covered) =
1 - fdfP(Failure was covered I Drifting failure)
- (1-fdf)P(Failure was covered I Hardover failure)
P(Correct sensor i data I k sensor modules work) =
1 - (1-Rsi) k - kRsi(1-Rsi) k-1P(Last sensor failure
was not covered) (k >2)
Ns
Rss	 NmRsm(1-Rsm)Nm-1
	
R	 P(Last sensor module failure
V=I 
s
is covered) + ^m Nm R  (1-R )Nm
-k N 
P(Correct
k=2 (k ) sm	 sm i-1
sensor i data ( k sensor modules work)
20
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Input voter and computation system reliability:
R cs	 1	 (1-R
vc )Nc	 NcRvc(1-Rvc)Nc-1P(Lagt channel failure
was not covered)
t Output voter and actuator system reliability:
F
R
v^
R	 =	
No 	 (NO) Rk (1-R ) N^ ^ k N R	
k R
`	 ( l-R	
k-,^1
va	 vp	 vp	 ai	 _	 ^/ ad	 adi)
f	 k=Nf k	 i-1-Nf	
i
UFTCS reliability:
u
Rsystem - RpssRssRcsRva
The probabilities of detecting the last failure can be
manipulated to determine the system reliabilities for the
"failing to two" and "failing to one" cases. For the"failing to
one" case, the probability of covering the last sensor module
failure and the probability of covering the last input voter and
i
computation system failures should be set to one. Likewise, the
probability of covering the sensor failures should be set to some
..s easonable value (e.g. 0.5 -nor  drifting failures and 1.0 for
hard failures). For the "failing to two" case, the probability
of covering the last failure should be set to 0.0 for all modules
and oensors'.'
`	 COMPONENT FAILURE RATES
Sensor Failure Rates
Obtaining failure rates for the sensors was one of the more
difficult tasks of the analysts for several reasons. First, the
21
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t
sensor manufacturers were somewhat reluctant to provide
information for the purposes of any analysis; they have been
"blamed" for poor system performance in the past, and are
therefore reluctant to participate in this manner. Second,
sevoral airframe manufacturers were contacted, but they buy
combination sensor-computer subsystems (e.g., air data computers,
and inertial reference systems), and they were not able to
provide reliability figures for the specific sensors u,ed in this
analysis.
To circumvent these difficulties, we have evaluated the
UFTCS with a "best guess" reliability estimate for each generic
sensor and have supplemented these
	 calculations
	 with a
sensitivity analysis for the sensors in the helicopter mission.	 ai
These sensitivity analyses can be used to determine the sensor
reliability .requirements to achieve desired overall system
reliability.
r
This analysis assumes that re`Aability is pore important
than cost and that mass-produced sensors are not used.
Therefore, the reliability data used in this analysis is taken
from the most reliable components found in the survey.
	
Converting Reliabilities Between Environments.
	 In some
instances the reliability
	 stimates were obtained oy	 for the same
sensor, but in different environments. These reliabilities were
multiplied by scale factors, not only to convert the
reliabilities to one environment for choosing the "best guess"
reliability, but also to convert the reliabilities to the three
environments of the analysis (helicopter, air transport, and
space flight). The scale fact-ors are based on the environmental
parameters found in MIL-HDBK-217D [6], and are shown in Table 1.
	
I
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Table 1
Scale Factors for Converting Failure Rates
Between Environments
To convert	 Multiply the failure rate by
from this
	
the indicated scale factor
environment
Helicopter	 Air Transport	 Space Flight
Helicopter	 1.0	 0.2	 0.04
Air Trnspt	 5.0
	 1.0	 0.2
Space Flight	 25.0	 5.0	 1.0
Accelerometer Reliabilities. Four Mean Time Between
Failures (MTBF) were obtained for accelerometers. When converted
to the air transport environment they were 50,000, 302000,
20,000, and 6,000 hours. Based on these estimates, a failure
rate of 20 failures per million hours (air transport environment)
was chosen for the generic accelerometer.
Gro Reliabilities. Three MTBFs for gyros were obtained,
k 
and when converted to the air transport environment, they were
70,000, 60,000, and 11,000 hours. A failure rate of 15 failures
per million hours (air transport environment) was chosen for the
generic gyro,
Long Term Heading Reference. Only one MTBF for a flux gate
compass, 50,000 hours for the air transport environment, was
obtained. A failure rate of 20 failures per million hours (air
transport environment) was chosen for the generic flux gate
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compass.
Barometric Altimeter Reliability. Four MTBFs for a
barometric altimeter, 25,000, 10,000, and two at 7,000 hours for
the air transport environment, were obtained. A failure rata of
40 failures per million hours (air transport environment) was
chosen for the generic altimeter.
Optical Position Sensors. Attempts to obtain reliability
estimates for optical position sensors were unsuccessful. Thus a
	 F
generic sensor was conceived and consists of 10 photo transistors
in a linear array. Based on this assumption and the failure
rates of phototransistors in [6), the failure rate of the optical,
sensor is found to be 20 failures per million hours.
j
Table 2 summarizes the sensor failure rates used in the
UFTCS reliability analyses.
4.
	Table 2	 ti
Sensor Failure Rates Used in UFTCS Analyses
(failures per million hours)
Sensor	 Environment
Helicopter
	
Air Transport	 Space Flight
Accel.	 100	 20	 --
Gyro	 75	 15	 3.	 j
Long Term	 ai
Hdg Ref	 100	 20	 --
Baro Alt	 200	 40	 --
Opt. Pos.
	 --	 --	 20
Al
y
Other Failure Bates
n
Failure rates for the computational elements and voter
elements were computed from the circuit design of these elements
as adapted from drawings supplied by NASA.
	 These calcualations
were	 performed
	
according
	 to	 the procedures outlined in
NAIL-HDBK-217D (6), and are detailed in the Appendix.
The ships power supplies and the actuators are not
considered as part of this analysis, and so it is assumed that
	 G
they have zero failure rates. The analysis has been formulated
so that their reliabilities can be incorporated at a later date.
RESULTS
Assumptions and Constants
.;
Certain assumptions have been made, and certain parameters
are held constant for all of the calculations unless explicitly
s',ated otherwise.
o The baseline sensor f ilure rates are those shown in.
Table 2.
o There are four output voters and actuator drivers (flux
windings) for each actuator. Valid signals are required vn at
least two windings for proper operation.
I
o The probability of 'Mailing to two" means that there are
at least two operating computation modules and there are at least
two operating sensors for each measurement; each of these
sensors feeds into an operating sensor moduls. The probability
of "failing to one" means that there is at least one Qf each 6f
25
0these items in operation.
o When "failing to one", the probabilities of covering the
last sensor module failure and the last voter/computation module
failure is 1.0. The probability of covering the last sensor
failure is 0.9 for all sensors. This result from assuming that
20% of the sensor failures are drifting failures; the
probability of covering the last drifting failure is 0.5; and
the probability of covering a hardover sensor failure is 1.0.
t
Mission Reliability Estimates
	
The primary objective of this report
	 is	 to	 supply
reliability estimates of UFTCS operation at various times in the
helicopter, air transport, and space flight missions.
	 Initial
	
system configurations are 4, 5, and 6 redundant paths (with four 	 u
N
output voters and flux windings), and failures are allowed to 1
or 2 operating paths.
The reliability estimates are shown in Table 3 assuming
perfect sensors (all sensor failure rates equal zero), and Table
4 assuming the baseline sensors. The results with the perfect
sensors are indicitive of the inherent reliability of the UFTCS
itself, whereas the other table shows the reliability of the
combination of sensors and control system. Note that there is a
"floor" to the probabilities of failure which, as will be shown
	
later, are due to the ass.zmption of 4 flux windings on each 	 r
actuator.
Sensitivity Analyses
This Section describes the results of sensitivity analyses
t
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Table 3
Predicted probabilities of failure for UFTCS
with perfect sensors
i
Helicopter environment (35C)
m
Fail to/ Operating time	 (hours, no maintenance)
start with 1 10 20
1/4 0.71E-13 0.73E-10 0.61E-09
2/4 0.10E-10 0.10E-07 0.80E-07
115 0.70E-13 0.70E-10	 `' 0.56E-09
2/5 0.72E-13 0.86E-10 0.81E-09
1/6 0.70E-13 0.70E-10 0.56E-09
2/6 0.70E-13 0.70E-10 0.56E-09
Air transport environment (250)
i
Fail to/ Operating time (hours, no maintenance)
start with 1 10 20
1/4 0.20E-13 0.22E-10 0.19E-09	 t
2/4 0.70E-11 0.69E-08 0.55E-07
	 F
1/5 0.20E-13 0.20E-10 0.16E-09
2/5 0.21E-13 0.29E-10 0.31E-09
1/6 0.20E-13 0.20E-10 0.16E-09
2/6 f.20E-13 0.20E-10 0.16E-09
i
Space craft environment (250)
Y
Fail to/ Operating time (hours, no maintenance)
start with 336 2190 4380
1/4 0.64E•-07 0.73E-04 0.94E-03
2/4 0.13E-04 0.30E-02 0.20E-01
115 0.21E-07 0.11E-04 0.20E-03
2/5 0.24E-06 0.33E-03 0.4'E-02
1/6 0.20E-07 0.61E-05 0.69E-04
2/6 0.24E-07 0.40E-04 0.86E-03
1
j;
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ITable 4
Predicted probabilities of failure for UFTCS
with baseline sensors
Helicopter environment (350)
a
Fail to/	 Operating time (hours, no maintenance)
start with	 1 10 20
1/4 0.1GF-10 0.14E-07 0.12E-06
2/4 0.15E-09 0.15E-06 0.12E-05
115 0.75E-13 0.11E-09 0.13E-08
2/5 0.12E-12 0.52E-09 0.77E-08
1/6 0.70E-13 0.70E-10 0.57E-09	 S
2/6 0.70E-13 0.72E-10 0.61E-09	 4
Air transport environment
r
(25C)I
41	 Fail to/	 Operating time (hours, nc maintenance)
Istart with	 1 10 20
1/4 0.77E-12 0.77E-09 0.62E-08
2/4 0.14E-10 .0.14E-07 0.12E-06
115 0.20E-13 0.21E-10 0.113E-09
2/5 0.22E-13 0.41E-10 0.49E-09
1/6 0.20E-13 0.20E-10 0.16E-09
2/6 0.20E-13 0.20E-10 0.16E-09
Space craft environment (25C) i
Fail to/ Operating time (hours, no maintenance)
start with., 336 2190 4380
1/4 0.28E-05 0.82E-03 0.67E-02	 I
2/4 0.39E-04 0.88E-02 0.55E-01
115 0.83E-07 0.11E-03 0.162-02
2/5 0.84E-06 0.12E-02 0.14E-01
1/6 0.22E-07 0.20E-04 0.44E-03
2/6 0.38E-07 0.16E-03 0.35E-02
,
^	 ^^ ^ I M^Jyi^.	 .. .`.	 ...	 ,..,.	
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to explore some of the parameters of interest in the 'UFTCS. The
10 hour point in the helicopter mission was chosen for
examination because of the {,.reater liklihood that UFTCS will be
applied to helicopters in the immediate future.
Coverage of Sensor Failures. When failing from two to one
sensors, there is a chance that the failure will not properly be
isolated, especially if it is a drifting failure. The parameter
af'f'ecting system reliability is the probability of detecting this
last sensor failure which is in the range of [0.5, 1.01.
	 Figure
3 shows the sensitivity of system reliability to this parameter
when the initial configuration has 4 and 6 channels., Also shown
for comparison purposes are the (constant) curves for failing to
two for 4 and 6 channels. It can be seen that 4 channels failing
to 1 is sensitive to this sensor coverage, and that the
probability of system failure increases by a factor of 10 as the
probability of sensor coverage drops from 1.0 to 0.9, the nominal
value. However, the sensitivity to this coverage is less for the
other configurations because of the floor, effect of the number of
flux windings.
Barometric Altimeter Reliability=. The reliability of the
barometric altimeter is of interest because it is the least
reliable of all sensors. Figure 4 shows the effect of this
failure rate on overall system reliability. It can be seen that
there are two floor effects here. For the 6 channel case, the
floor is .7E-10 which is determined by the number of flux
windings. The two floors for the 4 channel case are determined
by the reliability of the other sensors in each sensor module..
These floors are reached when the barometric altimeter failure
rate is near those of the other sensors at approximately 100
failures per million. hours (FPM).
Gyro Reliability. The effect of the reliability of the
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gyros is examined because three of the 6 sensors in each module
are gyros, thus possibly magnifying the effect of increases in
gyro failure rates. Figure 5 shows the effect of gyro failure
rata with the same general pattern, as for the barometric
altimeter.
Number of Flux Windings. It is not necessary within the
UFTCS architecture to have 4 flux windings driven by 4 output
voters. However, it should be assumed that at least half of the
flux windings must operate properly to have an operational system
because of the flux summing operation. Figures 6 and 7 show the
effects on system reliability of 2 to 10 flux windings for each
actuator. Figure 6 is for the special case of perfect sensors to
see the effects of-the UFTCS hardware alone; Figure 7 shows the
effects of the number of flux windings on the reliability of the
sensor control system combined. The most striking results are
the removal of the "floor" at .7E-10 when the number of windings
is 6 or more, verifying the limitation on system failure rate
seen in previous results. (Figure 6 also shows that a large
number of windings can penalize system reliability, although the
penalty is slight.) It can be seen in Figure 6 that the floor can
become very low for perfect sensors, but Figure 7 indicates that
with the nominal sensors there is little value in increasing the
number of windings beyond 6 wren there are 6 sensor and
computational modules.
Sensor Modules vs. Computational Modules. Although it is
convenient to think of the UFTCS as having N channels, there is
no requirement that the number of sensor modules must equal the
number of computational modules or number of flux windings. The
cross-strapping of information to the input voters and output
voters removes the need for this constraint. In fact, it seems
logical that there should be a large number of unreliable parts
of the system and a small number of the reliable parts of the
l
h.
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Figure 5• Probability of system failure versus rate gyro
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Figure 7. Probability of system failure versus number of
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windings for proper operation (baseline sensors).
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system. Tables 5 and 6 show the system reliability as a function
of the number of sensor modules, computation modules, and flux
windings, failing to two and one. Table 5 assumes perfect
sensors, in order to examine the effects of differing amounts of
UFTCS hardware, and Table 6 assumes the baseline sensors, in
order	 to	 examine	 the	 tradeoffs	 to	 obtain a reliable
sensor/control system combination.
Tables 5 and 6 may be used to choose a system configuration
to meet a desired system reliability goal at the 10 hour point of
the helicopter mission. For example, Table 7 shows the system
configurations that will meet a goal of system failure less than
1E-10 assuming both perfect and baseline sensors.
Even though a configuration with baseline sensors and
"failing to one" requires six sensor modules, we feel that a
configuration with only five sensor modules would be adequate
because of the conservative nature of the approximation made in
the analysis. The approximation requires that all input
processors driven by a sensor module be operational for that
sensor module to work properly, and the input processor is among
the most unreliable components in the system (see component C8751
in Table A4 in the Appendix). A configuation consisting of four
flux windings, four computation modules, and five sensor modules
with baseline sensors results in a failure rate only slightly
higher than.1E-10.
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Table 5
Probability of system failure versus configuration
(perfect sensors)
[Upper entry is failing to one •
lower entry is failing to twoj
4
Number of Number of input voter/computation modules
sensor
modules 2 4 5 6 8
Four output v oters and flux windings
2 0.19E-05 0.36E-06 0.46E-06 0.57E-06 0.83E-06
0.35E-02 0.12E-02 0.14E-02 0.15E-02 0.18E-02
4 0.17E-05 0.73E-10 0.70E-10 0.71E-10 0.71E-10
0.26E-02 0.10E-07 0.13E-08 0.18E-08 0.31E-08
5 0.17E-05 0.73E-10 0.70E-10 0.70E-10 0.70E-10
0.26E-02 0.91E-08 0.86E-10 0.72E-10 0.74E-10
6 0.17E-05 0.73E-10 0.70E-10 0.70E-10 0.70E-10
0.26E-02 0.91E-08 0.85E-10 0.70E-10 0.70E-10
8 0.17E-05 0.73E-10 0.70E-10 0.70E-10 0.70E-10
0.26E-02 0.91E-08 0.85E-10 0.70E-10 0.70E-10
Six output voters and flux windings
2 0.24E-05 0.36E-06 0.46E-06 0.57E-06 0.83E-06
0.38E-02 0.12E-02 0.14E-02 0.15E-02 0.18E-02
4• 0.22E-05 0.43E-11 0.28E-12 0.38E-12 0.74E-12
0.29E-02 0.13E-07 0.13E-08 0.17E-08 0.30E-08
5 0.22E-05 0.47E-11 0.61E-13 0.54E-13 0.54E-13
0.29E-02 0.13E-07 0.24E-10 0.17E-11 0.35E-11
6 0.22E-05 0.47;-11 0.61E-13 0.54E-13 0.54E-13
0.29E-02 0.13E-07 0.23E-10 0.96E-13 0.58E-13
5 0.22E-05 0.47E-11 0.61E-13 0.54E-13 0.54E-13
0.29E-02 0.13E-07 0.23E-10 0.95E-13 0.54E-13
i
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Number of Number of input voter/computation modules
sensor
modules 2 4 5 6 8
Four output voters and flux windings
2 0.15E-02 0.15E-02 0.15E-02 0.15E-02 0.15E-02
0.18E-01 0.16E-01 0.16E-01 0.16E-01 0.16E-01
4 0.17E-05 0.14E-07 0.16E-07 0.18E-07 0.22E-07
0.26E-02 0.15E-06 0.16E-06 0.18E- 06 0.22E- 06
5 0 .17E-05 0.11E-09 0.11E-09 0.12E-09 0.13E-09
0.26E-02 0 .95E-08 0.52E-09 0.57E-09 0.72E-09
6 0.17E-05 0.73E-10 0.70E-10 0.70E-10 0.70E-10
0.26E-02 0.91E-08 0.86E-10 0.72E-10 0.72E-10
8 0.17E-05 0.73E-10 0.70E-10 0.70E-10 0.70E-10
0.26E-02 0.91E-08 0.85E-10 0.70E-10 0.70E-10
Six output voters and flux windings
2 0.15E-02 0.15E-02 0.15E-02 0.15E-02 0.15E-02
0.18E-01 0.16E-01 0.16E-01 0.16E-01 0.16E-01
4 0.22E-05 0.14E-07 0.16E-07 0.18E-07 0.22E-07
0.29E-02 0.16E- 06 0.16E- 06 0.18E-06 0.22E-06
5 0.22E-05 0.42E-10 0.43E-10 0.50E-10 0.65E-10
0.29E-02 0.13E-07 0.46E-09 0.50E-09 0.65E- 09
6 0.22E-05 0.48E-11 0.18E- 12 0.19E-12 0.24E-12
0.29E-02 0.13E-07 0.24E-10 0.15E-11 0.20E-11
8 0.22E-05 0.47E-11 0.61E-13 . 0.54E- 13 0.54E- 13
0.29E-02 0.13E-07 0.23E-10 0.95E-13 0.54E-•13
[	
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Table 6
w^
Probability cf system failure versus configuration
(baseline sensors)
[Upper entry is failing to one •
lower entry is failing to twoj
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e Perfect Sensors Baseline Sensors
Failing to	 4 flux windings 4 flux windings
1 4 computation modules 4 computation modules
4 sensor modules 6 sensor modules
Failing to	 /+ flux windings 4 flux windings
2 5 computation modules 5 computation modules
5 sensor modules 6 sensor modules
Table 7. System Configurations with probability of failure	 less
than 1E-10
i
S
CONCLUSIONS
PR
The reliability calculations for the baseline system clearly
indicate that the 4 flux windings limit overall probability of
system failure to no less than .7E-10 at the 10 hour point in the
helicopter mission. The sensitivity analyses were also
influenced by this limit. Tables for probability of failure at
the 10 hour point in the helicopter mission are provided as a
` function of the number of computation modules, sensor modules,
and flux windings; these tables allow the designer to choose a
configuration which will meet a specified probability of failure
Y^
	
at this point of the helicopter mission.
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APPENDIX
tt
Component and Module Reliability Calculations
s
The component reliability values were determined using
references
	 5	 and	 6.	 Tables
	 Al	 through A3 list the
component-specific data and assumptions used in the calculation. 	 k
In addition, the following characteristics were assumed for all
microelectronics:
1. Hermetically sealed,
2. Dual in-line packaging,
3. Eutectic die attach,
4. Glass seal,
5. MIL-M-38510,
 Class 9, and
6. Learning factor = 1.
Ambient temperatures for the calculations were 25° C for the
space craft and air transport environments and 35° C for the
helico pter environment. Case temperatures were taken - from
reference 6, table 5.1.2.5
-4, note 2 (space flight, 40° C;
helicopter and air transport, 60° C).
k
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Part No. M28510/ Description
SNJ54LS02J 30301C Quad 2 input positive NOR gates
SNJ54LSO4J 30003C Hex inverters
SNJ54LS10J 30005C Triple 3 input positive NAND gates
SNJ54LS74AJ 30102C Dual D-type flip flops
SNJ54LS125AJ 323010 Quad bus buffer gates
SNJ54LS138J 30701E 3 to 8 line decoder
SNJ54LS139J 30702E Dual 2 to 4 line decoders
SNJ54LS367AJ 32203E Hex bus drivers
SNJ54LS368AJ 32204E Hex bus drivers
SNJ55113J 10405E Line driver
SNJ55115J 10404E Line receiver
MC7805 10706Y 5V Voltage Regulator
MC7824 10709Y 24V Voltage Regulator
DAC08A 11302E 8 bit Digital to Analog Convertor
LM118 10107C Operational Amplifier
Table A2
CROSS REFERENCE OF COMPONENTS LISTED IN MIL-M-38510
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Table A3
ASSUMPTIONS FOR DISCRETE COMPONENT RELIABILITY CALCULATIONS
MIL-HDBK
Component -217D Assumptions
Resistors 5.1.6.1 Composition resistors
MIL-R-39008 Level M
Less than 100K ohms
Ratio of operating to rated
wattage = 0.5
Trimmer 5.1.6.7 Non wire wound resistors
Resistors MIL-R-39035 Level M
10 to 50K ohms
Ratio of operating to rated
wattage = 0.5
Ratio of applied to rated
voltage = 0.8 to 0.1
Capacitors 5.1.7.4 Ceramic capacitors
MIL-C-39014
	 MoLevel
Rated at 125	 C
Ratio of operating to rated
voltage = 0.5
Zener Diodes 5.1.3.5 MIL-STD-19500
JAN Quality Level
Max permissible junction
Temperature = 1750 to 200° C
Max case temperature (1007 rated
load and max junction
temperature not
exceeded) = 25° C
Ratio of (Power dissipated to
max rated power) or (operating
zener current to max rated
zener current) = 0.5
Diodes 5.1.3.4 MIL-S-19500
JAN Quality Level
Metallurgically bonded
Current rating < 1 amp
Ratio of applieT to rated
reverse voltage < 0.6
Max permissible junction o
temperature = 175
	 to 200	 C
k
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Table A3 (concluded)
i
c
Diodes (continued) Ratio of operating forward
current to maximum rated
forward current = 0.5
Max case temperature (100% rated
load and max junction
temperature not
exceeded = 250 C
Power recIfier application
Photodiodes 5.1.3.10 JAN Quality Level
Photodiode Detectors 5.1. 3. 10 JAN Quality Level
Quartz Crystals 5.1.15 MIL-C-3098
Relays 5.1.10 MIL SPEC Quality Level M
Temperature rating = 125° C
Ratio of operating load
current to rated resistive
load current = 0.5
Cycles per hour < 1
High speed application
Dry reed construction
SPST action
Fiber Optic Cables 5.1.15 Length < 1 Km
Single 'fiber type
Fiber Optic Connectors	 5.1..15
Electrical Connectors
	
5.1.12	 MIL SPEC Quality
Type B insert material
Number of active contacts = 3
5 to 50 mating/unmating cycles
per 1000 hours
Printed Wiring Boards 	 5.1.13	 MIL-P-55110
One two-sided board per module
500 plated through holes per
module
Solder Connections	 5.1.14	 Rdflow lap solder
500 solder connections per module
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1To implement the optical link between modules, the line
driver/receiver indicated on NASA drawings A14-82-235-101 and
-102 (part number 75118) was replaced.	 Each line driver was	 t''
I
replaced by a SNJ55113 'line driver and a photo diode, and each
line receiver was replaced by a SNJ55115 line receiver, and a	 i
photo diode detector. The basis for this subs':itution was that
reference 6 contained failure rate data for these devices, and no
data, related to currently available optical H:Irivers/receivers
could be obtained. However, these devices contain the basic 	 3
hardware to implement the optical drivers/receivers, and the data
6
should be reasonably accurate.	 I
The design of the sensor voter module as described in NASA
drawing A14-82-235-102 was modified slightly for the output voter
module. To provide an analog output, the output driver for each
actuator was replaced by an 8 bit digital-to-analog converter
(DAC-08A), control logic (SNJ54LSO2 quad NOR gates), and a
differential driver as shown in figure Al.
k
A
R
The failure rate for the flux summer module was calculated
based on the design as shown in figure A2. The module failure
rates do not include the electrical/mechanical interface (in
figure A2, the LVDT).
The analog circuits on both the actuator voter and flux
summer modules require other than a +5V power supply. The design
assumed for the power supplies is shown in figure A3.
w The 8 bit microprocessor chip on all modules (08751H-11).
consists of a microprocessor and on-chip RAM (128 X 8) and ROM
(4K X 8). The composite failure rate for the chip was calculated
by determining	 the	 failure rates for each sub-component
(processor, RAM, and ROM) and summing the three results.
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A summary of the failure rates for each of the components in
each of the three environments under study is included in table
A4. The componer;,t parts count for each module is shown in table
A5.
1
t.
49
G
50
. 
J^
AX41
Table A4
COMPONENT FAILURE RATES(FAILURES/10 **6 HOURS)
COMPONENT SPACE CRAFT HELICOPTER AIR TRANSPORT
08751 2.059834 5.569568 5.410203
D8086 0.586990 1.595600 1.465600
C8087 1.430970 3.441400 3.309000
D2764 0.504830 1.659030 1.561530
HM6116P 0.389820 1.451700 1.352700
MD8282 0.016609 0.096705 0.050205
MD8284A 0.015914 0.087330 0.046830
MD8286 0.011860 0.083900 0.039400
MD8288 0.032147 0. 132056 0.083231
HD1-6402 0.281900 0.235450 0.110950
54LS02 0.005231 0.045853 0.019853
54LSO4 0.005400 0.046360 0.020360
54LS10 0.005128 0.045544 0.019544
54LS74 0.005986 0.048660 0.022160
54LS125 0.005497 0.046480 0.020480
54LS138 0.007414 0.059850 0.027350
54LS139 0.007550 0.060250 0.027750
54LS367 0.007123 0.058286 0.026286
54LS368 0.007051 0.058054 0.026054
MC7805 0.017420 0.085500 0.066500
MC7824 0.017420 0.085500 0.066500
DAC08A 0.055840 0.282300 0.212300
LM118 0.018710 0. 157350 0.119850
OPT TRAN 0.063460 0.455150 0.219910
OPT RECV 0.178930 0 .892950 0 . 662050
OPT CONN 0.100000 0.100000 0.100000
RESISTOR 0.000380 0 .010450 0.001064
TRIM RE8 0 . 016200 0.655200 0.081000
CAP 33 0.003744 0.244200 0.084150
CAP .036 0.003744 0.115440 0.039780
ZENER 0.002550 0.076140 0.030600
PWRDIODE 0.000929 0.030193 0.0'!1151
CRYSTAL 0.200000 0.200000 0 . 200000
RELAY 0.016886 0.816242 0. 067543
PC HOARD 0.003000 0 . 060000 0.012600
PO SOLDR 0.040000 0.640000 0.120000
ELEC CON 0.002325 0.058311 0.011625
OPT LINE 0.100000 0.100000 0.100000
r
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Table A5
COMPONENT PARTS COUNT
Sensor Input
Module Voter/
Comp.
Module
C8751 NC+1 NO+3
D8086 1 4
C8087 1 4
D2764 2 8
HM6116P 8 26
MD8282 2 8
MD8284A 1 4
MD8286 3 11
MD8288 1 4
HD1-6402 1 2
54LS02 0 1
54LSO4 0 1
54LS10 1 3
54LS125 NC/4 (NO/4)+1
54LS138 2 6
54LS139 0 1
54LS367 1 4
54LS368 2 6
MC7805 1 4
MC7824 0 0
DAC08A 0 0
LM118 0 0
OPT TRAN NC NO+1
OPT RECV NC NO+1
OPT CONN 2*NC ( 2*NO) +2
RESISTOR NC+9 NO+20
TRIM RES 0 0
CAP 33 NC+1 NO+1
CAP .036 NC+1 NO+1
ZENER	 .- 1 4
PWRDIODE 4 16
CRYSTAL (NC/2)+2 (NU/2)+7
RELAY 0 0
PC BOARD 2 4
PC SOLDR 2 4
ELEC CON 1 4
OPT LINE NC NO+1
a
Uutput Actuator
Voter	 Driver
Module	 Module
NC = Number of input voter/computation modules
NO = Number of output voter modules
k
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